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LEONARD v.B. SUTTON
AWARD PAPER*
The 1987 Soviet Joint Venture Law: New
Possibilities for Cooperation and Growth in
East - West Relations
DAVID M. BOST**
I. INTRODUCTION
In May of 1985 more than 400 American businesspeople attended
meetings in Moscow with Soviet trade officials as part of a conference
sponsored by the U.S. - U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission. The Soviets
hoped to accomplish a double purpose by hosting these meetings: demon-
strate to Western nations that it was willing to do business, and en-
courage Western governments to reciprocate by relaxing trade barriers.'
One year later, Soviet trade officials met in New York with U.S. trade
leaders to explore what forms would best facilitate Soviet-American busi-
ness relationships. After expressions of interest by Monsanto, Occidental
Petroleum, Singer Sewing Machine, and other companies,2 Soviet officials
announced a new Soviet Joint Venture Law in January of 1987.' Within
* The Leonard v.B. Sutton Award is presented each year in recognition of excellence in
international legal writing. The award is endowed by the Honorable Leonard v.B. Sutton.
Judge Sutton is a former Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, the former Chair-
man of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States, and an interna-
tionally renowned scholar and attorney.
** J.D., Denver University College of Law, 1989; B.A. The Colorado College.
1. Rogers, Glasnost and Perestroika: An Evaluation of the Gorbachev Revolution and
Its Opportunities for the West, 16 DEN. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 209, 211 (1988). The Soviet
description of the Commission's goals is: to search for ways of improving cooperation be-
tween the Soviet Union and United States' economies through seminars, symposiums, mar-
keting, joint scientific research, joint ventures and technology transfers. USSR TRADE Sup-
PLEMEN r, J. of Comm., Dec. 8, 1986, at 10.
2. Aronson, The New Soviet Joint Venture Law: Analysis, Issues, and Approaches for
the American Investor, 19 LAW & POL'Y. INT'L Bus. 851 (1987). Among other interested
companies which have recently entered into negotiations with the Soviets are: RJR Nabisco,
Mercator Corp., Chevron, Eastman Kodak and Johnson & Johnson. See Breakthrough: a
Journalist's Report From Moscow, THE NEW YORKER, April 17, 1989, at 30.
3. ON THE PROCEDURE FOR THE CREATION ON THE TERRITORY OF THE
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months the Soviets received over 200 proposals from interested Western
businesspeople.
Although there havc been joint venture laws in the Eastern Bloc for
some time,5 this Western access to the Soviet economy is new and reflects
a changing Soviet Union, in terms of perestroika and glasnost as well as
the desire to integrate its economy with the more prosperous West. This
change of attitude has spread throughout Soviet society and politics, and
is confirmed by other recent events such as the relaxation of controls on
information, the historic agreement between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to
eliminate intermediate range nuclear missiles,6 and a number of domestic
and foreign reforms.
Some observers and experts on Soviet affairs have remained skeptical
of Soviet attempts to become involved with the free market, while hold-
ing reservations about Soviet intentions in the joint venture realm.7 How-
ever, the new joint venture law conforms to the realities of perestroika
and glasnost, and reveals remarkable flexibility by conforming to Western
investors' needs.
The joint venture law can bring about more than the establishment
of many small ties for profit. Partnerships based on common economic
goals will allow communist and capitalist enterprises to encounter and
assimilate each other. This interdependence will require the creation
within a given venture of structures for developing shared interests and
resolving conflicts, as well as harmonizing what may be considered a new
communist - capitalist economic culture.
Because the joint venture law does not operate in a void, these many
small ties will implicate numerous social, economic, and political realities.
The venture's resolution of inevitable conflicts arising under the law due
to differing ideologies, will be paramount to the partnership's viability. It
is through this mutual resolution of problems that larger processes for
conflict resolution are created: a process for resolving conflicts in the
U.S.S.R. AND THE ACTIVITIES OF JOINT ENTERPRISES WITH THE PARTICIPA-
TION OF SOVIET ORGANIZATIONS AND FIRMS OF THE CAPITALIST AND DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES, 26 I.L.M. 750 (1987)[hereinafter JOINT VENTURE LAW].
4. Wall St. J., April 6, 1987 at 20 (the 200 proposals were counted as of April 1987).
5. There exist East-West joint ventures in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
and Yugoslavia. See Scriven, Co-operation in East-West Trade: the Equity Joint Venture,
10 INT'L Bus. LAW. 105, 109 (1982).
6. Agreement was signed Dec. 9, 1987.
7. It is no secret that the Soviet Union desires to attain the same advantages given
member states of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Consequently, it
has been hinted that the Soviets believe their democratization of certain government powers
through Glasnost may lead to admission to GATT. Rogers, supra note 1, at 227. Speculation
operates in the idea that the new joint venture law stems from the Soviet desire to gain
admission to GATT. One means of broadening the base of Soviet export earnings and a
prominent role in world trade can be linked to joint ventures as the proving ground for more
of the open free trade principles found in GATT. See Aronson, supra note 2, at 856-867.
Arguably, the Soviet joint venture law may be a stepping stone for Soviet inclusion to
GATT.
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larger context of East-West relations.
II. BACKGROUND
It is apparent that the Soviet Union no longer represents a compel-
ling ideal to the third world, or even to its own society. As one commenta-
tor recently observed, "[S]ince Communism is becoming an evident fail-
ure at home, it is increasingly difficult for the Soviets to sell it as the
wave of the future to third world and other countries." In an attempt to
stabilize and modernize the Soviet economy, the U.S.S.R. has found it
necessary to expand its role in the world market by implementing what
looks remarkably similar to capitalist reform. If so, this would not be the
first time the Soviets have found certain Western reform advantageous,
since as far back as the 1920's Lenin implemented many free-market re-
forms in times of crisis.' In fact there is an economic crises in the
U.S.S.R. today and, as one author has determined, the programs the Sovi-
ets are implementing to correct its problems "[a]rise from the new Soviet
consciousness that its economic system is not working and that if it
wishes to keep pace economically and culturally with the rest of the
world, [it] must make 'significant changes.' "10
Before the enactment of one such change - the joint venture law -
foreign investment in the Soviet Union was limited to Industrial Coopera-
tion Agreements (ICA's),"' which required a Western investor to furnish
the Soviets with the capital, equipment, and technical expertise essential
to make the Soviet run operation function. Without any real say in the
operation of the ICA or in managing the operations, Western investors
were left only with the hope they could recoup the cost of their original
investment.1 2 This conformed to the reality of the U.S.S.R.'s centrally
planned economy, controlled and administered entirely by a rigid and en-
trenched bureaucracy bent solely on state ownership of all means of pro-
duction, prohibiting the private use of hired labor, and private manage-
ment: a virtual ban on private business for profit.
The joint venture law is a stark contradiction to past Soviet policies
on foreign investment. Joint ventures are a creative form of business rela-
tionship, existing in many forms, and managed by their respective part-
ners. A joint venture is simply, "[A]n economic entity comprised of two or
more partners which combine their assets, and expertise, and agree to
share the profits and losses resulting from their jointly managed
enterprise.""
The desire to implement a joint venture law in the Soviet Union
8. Rogers, supra note 1, at 211.
9. Id. at 239.
10. Id.
11. Dunn, The New Soviet Joint Venture Regulations, 12 N.C. J. OF INT'L & COMM.
REGS. 171, 174 (1987).
12. Id. at 175.
13. Aronson, supra note 2, at 855.
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came partly from the knowledge that joint ventures provide their host
country with great opportunities in research and development. These
benefits were made obvious by China's success with its joint venture
law."' The Chinese experience, and the fact that joint ventures between
capitalist countries have also been successful, 5 has improved the Soviets'
receptivity to joint ventures.
III. THE JOINT VENTURE LAW - GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. The Venture Proposal
The first step for parties interested in creating a joint enterprise is to
submit a proposal to the Soviet partner's local ministry. The proposal is
to reflect an interested investor's tentative plans for a business activity
with a Soviet partner. After being processed through the Soviet bureau-
cracy, the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers decides whether to accept or
deny the proposal."8 The Council has wide discretion in making its deci-
sion. This discretion is limited only by such considerations as the Soviet
Union's need for raw materials, foodstuffs, new technology and manage-
ment techniques, a desire to enhance the value of the ruble, increase im-
ports of foreign exchange, and expand the export base of the U.S.S.R.."
B. Structure of the Joint Venture
The structure of the joint venture is determined by a number of
mandatory and permissive provisions in the joint venture law. In the orig-
inal 1987 law, a Soviet partner was to own not less than fifty-one percent
interest in the joint venture; however, the law has since been changed
permitting Western partners more than fifty percent ownership.' 8 The
venture is to be considered an individual entity, self-financing and with
its own balance sheet. That is, the enterprise must "sink or swim" on its
own.1
9
14. China has permitted an "open door policy" to Sino-Foreign partnerships in the
form of joint ventures for 10 years. These have brought China over 6 billion dollars in for-
eign investment from over 7,000 foreign investors. See Yuquing, Like Bamboo Shoots After
a Rain: Exploiting the Chinese Law and New Regulations on Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures,
8 N. W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 59, 118 (1987).
15. Since 1978 a number of industrial nations focused on joint ventures as a progressive
business. Most of those countries were high profit residence states such as the United King-
dom, United States, Japan, France, and West Germany. KAREN J. HLADIK, INTERNATIONAL
JOINT VENTURES 6 (1985).
16. 16 JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at 750, secs. 1 & 2.
17. Id. at 750-751, sec. 3.
18. Telephone interview with Harold E. Rogers, Jr., International Attorney and Author
on U.S. - Soviet business transactions (April 10, 1989). For a view of the old forty-nine
percent rule see id. at 751, sec. 5.
19. With a view of the past, this provision is startling to most observers because it
allows soviet business to run itself for the first time, and allows joint ventures to set produc-
tion limits and goals free from government control. See Dunn, supra note 11, at 174. What
M.S. Gorbachev has stated as the key to the new Soviet economic and social reform is, "[t]o
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The venture will conclude contracts on its own, acquire property, and
have the right to sue and be sued.2 0 Each venture is to have a board with
Soviet citizens as the Chairman and General Director. Participants of the
venture have the right, by mutual consent, to transfer their share of own-
ership to third persons. However, the Soviet partner has a first right of
purchase and any transfer must be approved by the Council of
Ministers.2
The joint venture must employ a labor force that is made up primar-
ily of Soviet citizens,22 thus the venture may enter into contracts with
Soviet labor organizations. The venture must pay its workers wages, so-
cial security and pensions at a rate determined by Soviet law. All disputes
between the partners, and between the venture and other businesses, may
be settled either in the Soviet courts or by a Soviet arbitration tribunal.2"
Finally, the joint venture must create a charter and file it with the Coun-
cil of Ministers. The contents of the Charter must include the purposes of
the venture, its location, composition of ownership, the stated amount of
each partner's capital contributions, and a statement of the Charter fund
composition.
The composition of the charter fund includes a statement of the
amount of foreign currency, as opposed to the rubles brought into the
venture. The value of each partner's property (capital contribution) is to
be determined by its conversion into rubles.2 This valuation is the deter-
mining factor of ownership interest and profit allocation between the
partners.
The duration of the venture may be perpetual; it is limited solely by
the Charter.2" The Charter may also include any other provisions which
allow the partners to further define their duties and relationship to one
another. Thus, having a Soviet Chairman and General Director does not
necessarily eviscerate a foreign partner's voting and decisionmaking
rights. Structures and rules for inter-venture decision making may be de-
fined by agreement between the partners and incorporated into the ven-
carefully prepare, within the year 1987, and to implement in the U.S.S.R. law on State En-
terprises. To extend its action to all enterprises in 1988 and 1989, and make them com-
pletely self accounting and self financing." Pravda, June 27, 1987, col. 1.
20. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at 751, sec. 6.
21. Id. at 752, sec. 16.
22. Soviet Council of Ministers Decision on Joint Ventures with Western Firms, 4
INT'L TRADE REP. 358, 361 (BNA) (Mar. 11, 1987).
23. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at 753, sec. 20.
24. Id. at 752, secs. 11-12.
25. Id. at 751, sec. 8. This is a very positive provision because many communist nations
limit their ventures' duration. Both Poland and Bulgaria place a 15-year maximum on the
length of the venture. Other socialist countries have similar principles. One problem associ-
ated with limitations on joint venture duration is that foreign partners must accept the
exploitation of their capital and technology by sacrificing their capital to the government
when exiting the partnership. See Scriven, supra note 5, at 109.
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ture charter.2" In many respects the charter operates in a manner similar
to partnership agreements in the Western legal world.17
C. Venture Operations
For its operations the joint venture may create branch offices within
the Soviet Union.2 It may purchase raw materials from the Soviet
Union;29 however, all the venture's purchases and sales in the Soviet do-
mestic markets must be transacted in rubles. ° The venture's cash assets
must be deposited in a Soviet State Bank, with foreign currency to be
immediately converted at an exchange rate determined either by world
money market rates or a procedure established by the State Bank.3 '
The venture may import and export goods as necessary, but it must
do so through a Soviet Foreign Trade Organization (FTO).3 2 Any foreign
currency expenditures flowing from the venture must be transacted with
the actual foreign currency brought in by the venture's export sales. The
foreign partner's repatriation of profits is similarly limited to the cur-
rency brought in by the venture's net export receipts.
3
1
IV. THE LAW'S INHERENT PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The new joint venture law presents ample opportunities for profit,
expanded trade, and improved foreign relations. Yet, because the law
does not operate in a void, it also presents problems that must be re-
solved. Major difficulties exist in regard to the law's provisions on foreign
exchange. There are, as well, the existing trade regulations promulgated
by the Soviet Union and Western nations: these alone present significant
obstacles. Finally, the absence of Soviet legal precedent in partnership
and contract law may well be the most daunting problem for joint
26. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at 753, sec. 21. Without a foreign partner
having the ability to make major management and production decisions, the entire purpose
of the Joint Venture law would be destroyed. The Soviets desire to learn Western decision
processes and without flexibility in the charter agreements the Soviet partners could domi-
nate the venture.
27. Id. at 751, sec. 7. This provision allows the partners to make specific contractual
obligations between themselves, thus minimizing disputes in the future.
28. Id. at 753, sec. 19.
29. There exist a number of incentives making it less likely that the venture will con-
tract for raw materials outside the country. Large tax breaks are given to ventures that
purchase their materials within the country. Extra taxes can be levied on raw materials that
are imported, even while available within the Soviet Union. For a more in depth review of
the tax consequences to the Joint Venture, see UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUB-
LICS: EDICT CONCERNING TAXATION OF JOINT ENTERPRISES IN THE SOVIET
UNION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 13, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 759
(1987)[hereinafter DISPUTE RES. LAW].
30. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at 754, secs. 25 & 26.
31. Id. at 754-755, sec. 29.
32. Id. at 754, sec. 24. This seems necessary because the Soviet's wish to prevent the
importation of undesirable commodities.
33. Id. at 755, secs. 30-32.
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venturers.
These problems can be solved and, in many cases, aspects of the law
which appear to be obstacles are in fact opportunities in disguise. The
process of problem solving is as important as the solutions to individual
problems. The joint venture law provides the Soviet Union and Western
nations with an opportunity to develop common approaches to problems
in circumstances where shared goals are clearly defined.
A. Foreign Exchange and Currency Problems
Foreign currency reserves are critical both to nations and joint ven-
tures. Using the foreign currency it has acquired, a nation can invest in
activities and products from abroad and enhance the state's ability to
compete in the world market. Not surprisingly, states are quite restrictive
in controlling the foreign currency that enters and leaves their economies.
International law also reflects this attitude: there is no bilateral treaty
anywhere in the international business world that allows a venture to im-
port or export domestic or foreign exchange freely."' A state's regulation
of foreign exchange is explicitly recognized as an act of sovereignty."
Some countries are less concerned with the acquisition of foreign cur-
rency than others. Its importance depends on a country's relative eco-
nomic status in the world. Thus, "While the acquisition of foreign ex-
change may be a high priority of the investment policy of the Sudan, it is
certainly not as important for Saudi Arabia, which seeks particularly to
acquire new technology.""8 Without question, the Soviet Union wishes to
acquire both foreign currency and new technology. In fact, the Soviet
need for foreign currency reserves is as great as that of Sudan; Soviet
currency has very little practical worth in the Western market.3 7 In its
trade with Western countries, the U.S.S.R. must use the currency of its
trading partners. Foreign currency is so important to a joint venture's
successful operation that it has been described as "the mother's milk of
joint venturing abroad.""
The new Soviet joint venture law's foreign exchange provisions also
present major difficulties for joint ventures. The law inhibits a joint ven-
ture's ability to obtain needed currency simply because the law is geared
toward increasing the Soviet acquisition of foreign exchange. The Soviets
have organized their joint venture law in a manner that makes joint ven-
tures a conduit for bringing in foreign currency. The law inhibits the ven-
ture from sending foreign currency out of the country once it has received
34. Salacuse, Host Country Regulation of Joint Ventures, in JoiNT VENTURES ABROAD
103 (1985).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 106.
37. Aronson, supra note 2, at 863. Of course, the Soviets need foreign currency to trade
with other countries and foreign businesses.
38. Salacuse, supra note 34, at 118.
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it." Provision 25 of the joint venture law limits the joint venture's use of
foreign exchange to the currency it earns through its own exports.4 0 The
venture is also precluded from obtaining currency subsidies and from bor-
rowing currency outside the U.S.S.R."1 This forces joint ventures to con-
centrate their activities more in the area of exporting goods rather than
selling in the Soviet domestic market where payment would be in
rubles.4
The biggest risk a venture faces when dealing with these restrictions
is that its exports might fail or fall short. It would then be unable to pay
its foreign creditors and repatriate the profits for its foreign partner." "In
substance, the new law's express 'guarantee' of the right to take of profits
in foreign exchange . . . will apparently apply only when the necessary
foreign exchange has been earned."" Under Soviet law, if the venture's
foreign currency runs out, it must make all its expenditures in rubles."'
Many capitalists will be discouraged from entering joint ventures if the
pot of gold they seek exists only in rubles.
B. Foreign Exchange Rate - The Ruble
The essential problem of foreign exchange is the valuation process of
the ruble: all foreign currency and capital originally contributed or
brought in through exports must be deposited in a Soviet State Bank and
then converted to rubles.4 6 The State Bank of the U.S.S.R. determines for
itself the official exchange rate.4 7 Such a one-sided determination of ex-
39. Although seeming harsh, such is not unusual in Eastern Bloc states, nor in China.
Yuquing, supra note 14, at 100.
40. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at 754, sec. 25.
41. Id. at 860-861.
42. As long as a joint venture decides to concentrate on selling its products exclusively
within the Soviet domestic market there would be little concern over foreign exchange since
the entire process can be accomplished in rubles. However, because foreign currency is re-
quired for making outside purchases and repatriating profits, a foreign partner benefits
more by using its Soviet facilities to manufacture its products for export to its previously
established Western markets. As witnesses in China's international joint venture law, for-
eign investors have geared toward primarily export oriented ventures, Yuquing, supra note
14, at 100. See also, Salacuse, supra note 34, at 106 (Soviet law has forced many to accept
export as the quid pro quo). It may indeed be more beneficial to Western partners if they
set up primarily export oriented joint ventures since it is likely the Soviets will go along
with proposals which give the Soviets some competitive advantage in the manufacture or
sale of a product. This is expecially true when the foreign partner lacks a great foreign
marketing operation and could benefit from such activity. If a foreign partner does have an
extensive marketing operation throughout the world, he receives little incentive to enter a
Soviet joint venture because start-up costs override the low wages found in the U.S.S.R.
43. Aronson, supra note 2, at 863.
44. Smith, U.S. - Soviet Joint Ventures: A New Opening in the East, 43 INT'L Bus.
LAW. 79, 84 (1987).
45. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at secs. 25-29.
46. Section 20 of the joint venture law dictates that the foreign currency acquired by
the venture must be deposited in a Soviet Bank for conversion into rubles.
47. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at sec. 29.
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change rates can result in an inflated valuation of the Soviet partner's
initial contribution and, eventually, the share of profit that partner re-
ceives.4 8 Thus, a partner's profits could vary at the whim of state
policymakers.4
9
Whi2 this discussion may lead one to believe that the future for joint
ventures is doubtful, it is still quite possible under the present law for
ventures to resolve the foreign exchange problems and reap sufficient
profits." The establishment of a fair exchange rate is more likely than it
seems. The Soviet Union has strong incentive to build up the interna-
tional integrity of its currency:
Gorbachev may represent the last chance of better integrating the So-
viet Union into the world economy. There it would come under pres-
sure to behave like a Western Country, competing for capital... low-
ering the barriers to foreign investment and even making its currency
convertible.5'
It is in the strong mutual interest of both Soviets and joint venture's to
establish a fair exchange rate for the ruble.2 Moreover, the joint venture
can protect itself from unreasonable exchange rates by agreement within
the venture charter. Both partners can agree as to the value of their re-
spective contributions and ownership interests."
The Soviets have recently reacted to this dilemma of poor ruble mar-
ketability by considering a new type of "special ruble" for international
trade purposes. This limited edition ruble, if approved, will be available
to Western partners, and backed by gold and hard currency reserves.5 4
This type of consideration enforces the idea that the Soviets view the new
law as both flexible and accommodating to Western needs.5
C. Import Substitution
Another way of relieving a venture's foreign exchange problems is
through import substitution. If a venture is producing certain products
which the Soviets need to import from abroad, it is much more economi-
48. Aronson, supra note 2, at 864.
49. Id. at 866.
50. Smith, supra note 44, at 84.
51. TIME, July 27, 1987, at 11.
52. There exist a number of obvious and not so obvious reasons for enhancing the value
of the ruble: 1) Since unfair rates will discourage foreign investors, the Soviets will be apt to
set a rate which encourages entrance into joint ventures; 2) The more joint ventures that
exist in the Soviet Union, the more the ruble is spread around the world community, and it
follows that this alone may enhance the integrity of the ruble in the free market; 3) The
more inflated the ruble becomes, the less likely it will ever be respected in the international
market.
53. Smith, supra note 44, at 89.
54. Soviet Union Considering Special Ruble to Lift Trade, Wall St. J., April 4, 1989, at
A17, col. 4.
55. Thus, we might consider this type of flexibility as a precursor to even greater Soviet
receptability to Western investors' needs.
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cal for the Soviets to trade with the venture and avoid the costs associ-
ated with importation, shipping, and excise taxes. If the Soviets pay the
venture for its products in rubles, they need not touch their foreign ex-
change reserves; however, the venture will be left with an excessive sur-
plus of unconvertible rubles.
Import substitution allows the venture to utilize a greater amount of
foreign currency than it could if limited solely to the currency it acquired
through its exports.5 The amount of rubles the venture receives from the
Soviets is valued at its worth in foreign currency, and the venture then
receives the right to borrow or withdraw foreign currency from abroad -
or even within the Soviet Union - up to the amount of the valuation.
This allows a joint venture to utilize needed foreign currency above and
beyond the limits of its export income, as well as repatriate profits and
pay foreign creditors.
The benefits of import substitution are reciprocal. The venture re-
ceives a higher limit on its foreign currency transfers, and the Soviets
reduce their foreign currency expenditures on goods from abroad. 7 The
use of import substitution is only one example of how the Soviets and
joint ventures can meet their needs by resolving problems in respect to
their shared interests.
D. Countertrade
Countertrade offers further solutions to the joint venture law's limi-
tations on foreign exchange. Countertrade is trade with an eye on avoid-
ing the exchange of money. One form of countertrade especially useful to
joint ventures is barter. Barter is the direct exchange of goods or com-
modities of equal or near equal value without the use of currency.58
Although barter encompasses only 4% of all countertrade transac-
tions worldwide,59 its practicality presents an obvious advantage for joint
ventures and the Soviets. A joint venture can trade the goods it produces
for the products of a foreign company. The goods received by the venture
may be divided up among the venture's partners according to their per-
centage of ownership. A foreign partner can avoid the harshness of the
Soviet controls on foreign exchange by having its share of the booty sent
to an FTO outside the Soviet Union. Thus, the FTO can sell the Western
partner's share of goods in exchange for convertible currency. The profits
from such can be deposited into a foreign account, thus allowing the part-
ner to repatriate its profits. Of course, the Soviet Union also profits in
this transaction - it acquires the goods received by the Soviet partner,
new trading partners in the free market, and increases exports of Soviet
56. Yuqing, supra note 14, at 102.
57. Aronson, supra note 2, at 861.
58. Rowberg, Countertrade as a Quid Pro Quo, in JOINT VENTURES ABROAD 211, 213
(1985).
59. Id. at 211.
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made goods.
Since it is often impossible to get immediate delivery of goods as
payment for outgoing goods, another more widely used form of counter-
trade (counterpurchase) may be utilized. Counterpurchase, or "buy-
back," is the exchange of goods for goods and is performed through recip-
rocal contracts. Each party pays for the other's goods in an escrow type
account upon receiving delivery of the goods, while guaranteeing by
promissory note that the other party will pay the same amount back into
the account upon receiving a reciprical delivery of goods." This avoids
foreign exchange problems because the currency never really leaves the
possession of the Joint Venture."
The Soviets should be very receptive to countertrade because of its
popularity and its benefits. Countertrade today encompasses over five
percent of all world trade, while some sources put it as high as thirty
percent.2 At least 88 countries, including socialist, developing, and devel-
oped states, require some form of countertrade in certain transactions."
China has the same restrictions on foreign exchange as do the Soviets,
6 4
and for them countertrade has been a great success." Even greater bene-
fits have been realized in the Slavic Communist nations. Western joint
venture partners in Yugoslavia have profited through countertrade, and
Yugoslavia has been able to afford the import of previously unattainable
goods from costly Western markets. Also, other Eastern Bloc countries
have also experienced a greater influx of needed consumer goods, a no-
ticeable rise in their exports, and a growth in their domestic industries.6
The utility of countertrade strikes a balance between the needs of part-
ners and the Soviet state. By recognizing the interests both desire from
trade, the joint venture and Soviet Union can develop a dialogue condu-
cive to their separate and shared interests, therefore, shaping both Soviet
law and a future Soviet-Capitalist economic culture.
E. Review by Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations
Although the joint venture law gives the Soviet venture the right to
import and sell goods in the domestic market,67 a Soviet Foreign Trade
Organization (FTO) must review and approve all transactions to deter-
60. Park, Countertrade Requirements in East - West Transactions, 10 INT'L Bus. LAW.
122, 123 (1982).
61. The venture can use the same lump sum of currency in a number of successive
transactions since only its presence in the account is important. For a more detailed descrip-
tion of countertrade transactions, see Atrisien & Buckley, Joint Ventures in Yugoslavia:
Comment, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 163 (1984). See also Rowberg, supra note 58, at 211.
62. BARTON & FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 80 (1986).
63. Rowberg, supra note 58, at 214.
64. Yuquing, supra note 14, at 100.
65. Id. at 96.
66. Atrisien & Buckley, supra note 61, at 166.
67. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at 754, sec. 24.
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mine if the goods are appropriate for Soviet domestic consumption. The
venture is not free to deal directly with Soviet citizens until approval is
granted. Therefore, if the Soviet FTO is motivated to promote exports
over domestic sales, or to protect Soviet industry from competition, a
joint venture oriented toward sales in the U.S.S.R. will seldom succeed. 9
One of the most problematic aspects of the Soviet Union's desire to
regenerate its ailing economy is the introduction of unplanned goods into
their planned economy."0 Because the Soviets fear an introduction of
goods that are "too new too soon," they require a FTO to approve all
joint venture goods designed for domestic sale.7 1 Another potential prob-
lem exists. It is not entirely clear whether the Soviets will require foreign
partners to bring the newest and most modern machinery and tools into
the joint venture. Some Eastern Bloc countries and less developed coun-
tries require a foreign investor to supply its venture with the most up-to-
date technology available.7
2
The potential for resolving conflicts associated with FTO's is promis-
ing. We must not forget the benefits host countries seek through their
joint ventures: increased foreign exchange, increased employment, public
revenue, the development of local resources, management experience,
technology, and improved quality in domestic goods.7 These benefits are
not always realized by a host country, and there is a danger that a ven-
ture can backfire, causing greater harm than good.74 Nonetheless, the So-
viet desire for obtaining the resulting benefits from joint ventures may be
motivation enough for allowing many previously unacceptable goods to be
sold domestically. 8 It is important to note that although FTO's are legal
entities, they are integral parts of the Soviet Ministry of Trade and,
therefore, representative of Soviet policy.7 Without the newest skills and
technology, the Soviets could neither compete in the world market nor
68. Smith, supra note 44, at 82.
69. Id. at 85. This situation might never arise if the joint venture states at the outset
what types of goods it plans to bring into the country. If this plan is approved by the Coun-
cil of Ministers, it seems unlikely an FTO could override Ministry approval.
70. Dunn, supra note 11, at 177.
71. Smith, supra note 44, at 85. There exists a possibility that if goods are designed
primarily for export or destined for other communist nations, the FTO might be more will-
ing to approve the venture's sale within Russia. Thus, a foreign partner should always seek
ministry approval of domestic sales before manufacturing.
72. Salacuse, supra note 34, at 15. The requirement provides a host country numerous
benefits, including: the examination of the newest technology around, modern equipment
which is less likely to break down and, low cost replacement parts. Likewise, these contribu-
tions on the part of foreign investors demonstrate their intentions to remain and make a
venture work.
73. Id. at 106.
74. These risks include foreign domination (both political and economic), as well as the
destruction of local competition, negative impact on foreign exchange reserves and, in the
communist world, adverse social effects from the introduction of undesirable consumer
goods. Id. at 107.
75. This is another example of how ideology must often accommodate practical need.
76. Dunn, supra note 11, at 174.
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improve their local industries.7 7 From the Soviet perspective, joint ven-
tures are the way these benefits can be obtained.7 8 There are a number of
steps joint ventures can take to prevent struggles with Soviet FTO's.
FTO's have discretion in how they deal with parties. They do not neces-
sarily have the same policies or negotiation techniques as their brother
organizations. 7s Thus, foreign partners should learn as much as possible
about the FTO they will work with. The investor should determine be-
forehand whether it wishes to sell its products in the Soviet domestic
market and whether permission to do so can be obtained from the FTO.
F. Foreign Regulation of Technology Transfers
A determination as to what technology may be brought into the So-
viet Union is not exclusive of the FTO's. Capitalist states have an even
greater say in what types of products and technological know-how may
enter the U.S.S.R. from the West. Technology transfers are heavily moni-
tored and regulated by most of the industrialized nations through their
membership in the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Con-
trols (COCOM).80 COCOM is designed to prevent militarily useful tech-
nology from being transferred by capitalist businesses and governments
to Communist nations. COCOM has the ability to prevent transfers
through political and economic pressures, including threats, and embar-
goes."' COCOM often enforces its purpose by committing its member
states to use their domestic law to punish those who export military tech-
nology to the Eastern Bloc. The states themselves may determine if a
certain transfer fits the definition of "militarily useful." COCOM has ef-
fectively blocked a number of transfers, as well as applied sanctions
against violators.8 2
The COCOM vision is to enable all capitalist nations to exchange
important technology freely, without the fear of having important techno-
logical information fall into the wrong hands. Ironically, this vision is in-
herently self - defeating: this paranoia held by Capitalist nations blocks
the flow of technology between industrialized nations.
77. Aronson, supra note 2, at 856.
78. Id. at 856. The newest advancements from Japan and South Korea are also a neces-
sity for Soviet competition. Asian countries may also enter Soviet joint ventures since the
law is open to all "Capitalist Countries." JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at 750,
sec. 1.
79. Smith, supra note 44, at 86.
80. COCOM includes Japan and all the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries,
with the exception of Iceland.
81. Aronson, supra note 2, at 888.
82. Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1988, at 17, col. 1. France arrested 4 people charged with selling
electronic measuring and communications equipment. This was done under the authority of
COCOM using French anti-espionage laws. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1988, at 32, col. 5. Pressure
was also exerted through sanctions against the Toshiba Corporation and Norway's Kong-
sberg Vaapenfabrikk for selling equipment to the Soviets which they could use to develop
quiet submarine propeller systems. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1988, at 26, col. 4.
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Many Western businesspeople feel the inclusion of certain items on
the COCOM embargo list is unwarranted. They feel that such inclusions
not only inhibit trade, but harm political relations as well. 8 3 More West-
ern businesses are entering the joint venture arena and the pressures they
alone can exert on their governments may result in a relaxation of export
controls.
Moreover, certain actions taken by states in the name of COCOM
have been assailed. One such challenge is reflected in an ongoing debate
within COCOM. On January 29, 1988, the European Committee (EC)
protested the United States' attempts at passing a Senate Trade Bill that
barred the importation of products from foreign corporations that the
U.S. determined had violated COCOM's Export Controls List. The EC
(which includes many COCOM members) complained that the legislation
interfered with the purposes of COCOM and was nothing less than an
"extraterritorial application of United States law."'8 4 These accusations,
as well as other pressures from COCOM members, may cause COCOM to
shorten the list of banned items.8 5
G. Domestic Policies of the Capitalist States
Further restrictions on technology transfers are made by the individ-
ual nations. The United States, for example, has export control laws
which restrict transfers of high technology. The Jackson Vanick Amend-
ment8" limits the extension of most favored nation status to countries
that have taken noticeable steps to improve human rights. The Soviet
Union has been excluded from this status because of its restrictions on
emigration." Strategically, the Soviets have taken a number of positive
steps in improving their emigration policies and the U.S. may soon act to
lift the Soviet's restricted status.8 8
The United States' Export Administration Act of 1979 also restricts
the export of goods and technology which could contribute to the military
83. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1988, at 26, col. 4.
84. N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1988, at 18, col. 5. Such protest by Western members of many
international trade agreements and committees is pressure which enables export standards
to be re-evaluated, and modified to the benefit of business.
85. Id.
86. 19 U.S.C. sec. 2432 (1982).
87. If the Soviets believe a most favored nation status would help improve its trade
relations and economy, it may find it advantageous to change its domestic policies even
more.
88. Charles A. Vanik, the co-author of the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment, recently
stated, "With the Soviet levels of immigration, and its dynamic effort to relax its regulations
on religion and culture, why should the U.S.S.R. be denied most-favored nation under a
Jackson Vanik waiver .. " quoted in T.L. Friedman, U.S. Gets Appeal for Freer Trade
With the Soviets, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1989, at A5, col. 3. The statement was made in a
speech before the American Committee on United States-Soviet relations. Secretary of State
James A. Baker was present and hinted that a waivor might soon be issued to the Soviets as
a method of testing the new thinking of the Soviets. Id.
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potential of countries viewed as a threat to U.S. national security. The
Act was invoked in 1982 after Western European governments and firms
began exporting American pipeline technology and equipment to the So-
viet Union in exchange for natural gas. Fearing that Western Europe
might become overly dependent on the Soviet gas, President Reagan is-
sued an executive order aimed at preventing further exports. The U.S.
used political pressure and the threat of embargoes to persuade its allies
that the venture was unacceptable. 9 To bolster its right to engage in
these activities, the U.S. cited a provision of the act:
No person in the United States or in a foreign country may export or
re-export to the U.S.S.R. foreign products directly derived from
United States technical data relating to machinery utilized for the ex-
ploration, [and] production . . . of natural gas .... 11
The European Community protested that the U.S. actions were in contra-
vention of "territoriality principles" accepted by all nations, including the
U.S.9 1
As tensions mounted between Europe and the U.S., the incident was
resolved, though not completely in favor of East-West trade.92 The ulti-
mate decision as to what actions will be taken under the act is within the
discretion of the President.
Laws such as these place a great burden on the Soviets and their
foreign partners: neither can be absolutely sure whether necessary capital
and technology will be available to them. However, businesses that are
interested in joint venturing, or that are already involved in a joint ven-
tures, can exert pressure on their governments to ameliorate especially
harsh restrictions.
9 3
V. IRREGULARITIES IN SOVIET LAW - PECULIARITIES IN APPLICATION
An important aspect of joint venturing in the Soviet Union involves
the venture's use of the Soviet court system. 4
The joint venture law permits partners in the joint venture to con-
89. The embargo list included oil and gas equipment as well as a general ban on certain
licensing issuances. See 83 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 28 (1983).
90. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. § 6(b) as amended by § 379.8 (1982).
91. European Communities: Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade
with the U.S.S.R., 21 I.L.M. 891 (1982).
92. Through economic and political compromise, the U.S. agreed that all present con-
tracts with the U.S.S.R. should be recognized. The Europeans agreed they would not con-
tinue the venture, and would instead seek alternate Western sources for their natural gas
needs. Resolution of the East-West Trade Regulations and the Soviet Pipeline Sanctions,
83 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 28 (1982).
93. For a much more detailed look at U.S. tranfers of technology to the Soviet Union,
see G. Armstrong Jr., Transferring U.S. Technology to the Soviets: Some Practical Legal
Problems, 16 INT'L. LAW. 737 (1982).
94. DISPUTE RES. LAW, supra note 29, at 759 (allowing the venture access to the
Soviet courts).
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tract with each other and with outside entities.9 5 Yet the Soviets have
only now begun to deal significantly with joint ventures. There is very
little applicable contract and partnership law in the Soviet Union.96 Con-
tract rights, until recently, were allocated to a small minority of govern-
ment entities, even though the Soviet Constitution provides its citizens
with such rights97 Soviet legislation places some limitations on contrac-
tual freedom,98 but there has been very limited litigation of contract
rights in the Soviet Union."
Not only is there a lack of substantive law in the areas of partnership
and contracts, but the joint venture law itself is in its infancy. Most of its
provisions still await an interpretation of law. As one author has sug-
gested, the law is written broadly and resembles a "moving target.' '100
Neither side can know exactly how the provisions will be applied in a
given set of circumstances.
This "naked" law could lead one to believe that resolution of a joint
venture's conflicts might be best achieved elsewhere. However, the dearth
of applicable law should not be regarded as an obstacle, but viewed as
providing a blank slate on which Western attorneys and Soviet lawmakers
can write laws that will enable the ventures to prosper.
Because a joint venture is the mutual assimilation of each partner
toward creation of a new entity, there will be a number of interests com-
mon to both partners as a unit. A venture strives to profit from its under-
takings and both partners will want to test and change laws that inhibit
the venture's ability to grow and profit. Simply stated, "[lit is through
the recognition of these goals by each partner that the necessary mutual-
ity of interests is created."'0 1
One area the joint venture will surely explore is the extent to which
partners may determine their respective duties and powers. For example,
the preliminary guidelines of the joint venture law do not specify how
much control a foreign partner may have in selecting management and
labor. 1 1 Thus, the venture's charter agreement is one means of testing,
95. JOINT VENTURE LAW, supra note 3, at 751, sec. 6.
96. Salacuse, supra note 34, at 115. The Soviets use a wide range of legal entities which
encompass their joint venture law. Their past use of agencies and ministries to monitor and
determine the outcome of disputes in their domestic realm must give way to dispute resolu-
tion in their courts. It is this change of legal supervision which provides the West an oppor-
tunity to integrate necessary laws into the system.
97. Id. at 113.
98. Article 234 of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Code provides that
changes in the Soviet National Plan may lead to a cancellation of contracts. Dore, Plan and
Contract in the Domestic and Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R., 8 SYR. J. INT'L. L. & COM. 29,
32 (1980)
99. Smith, supra note 44, at 82. See also id.
100. Rogers, supra note 1, at 853.
101. Scriven, supra note 5, at 106.
102. The termination of employees under current Soviet law can be accomplished only
under the most extreme circumstances. Aronson, supra note 2, at 874. Yet because poor
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defining, and developing the limits of newly enacted Soviet law.
Of course, there still exists the problem of what law should apply in a
given conflict. That there is virtually no Soviet law to apply to joint ven-
tures may well be the greatest benefit to the West. The U.S.S.R. has a
number of incentives for absorbing western style contract principles and
partnership law. First, the Soviets wish to acquire and integrate Western
technology and management techniques into their industrial sector.0 3
Adopting established and workable Western contract and partnership law
will expedite this process. Second, the Soviets would benefit from adopt-
ing Western law simply because of the difficulty involved in adapting ex-
isting Soviet law to cover the disputes unique to joint ventures. Finally,
Soviet receptivity to Western law will encourage greater Western
investment.
Western attorneys will need to use creative legal argument to protect
both partners' investment and define the boundries of newly established
law. "This transitional period of reform provides an opportunity for U.S.
lawyers to help shape the new Soviet legal and economic structure in a
way which would make it most advantageous for Western investment.""'0
This need for Western legal knowledge is already evident as one New
York law firm has established an office in Moscow."'
The greatest obstacle to Soviet assimilation of Western law is the
effect such developments might have on Soviet ideology and policy. After
all, Western law comes replete with such democratic principles as voting
rights, equality, and the right to profit. In theory, at least, the problems
with ideology can be solved, since these problems are the subject of recent
Soviet reforms. In fact, General Secretary Gorbachev has titled the re-
form process as "The Democratization of the Economy."'" Though the
Soviets will have to compromise some ideology to receive the benefits of
joint ventures, this compromise would be minimal. Simply enacting a
joint venture law was an enormous sacrifice of Marxist ideology: the So-
viet Constitution has always prohibited the ownership of industrial enter-
prises by anyone but the government. 07 Before recent changes, the law
permited a foreign partner to own only forty-nine percent of the venture.
However, the Soviets have recently made a dramatic change in the law by
allowing foreigns partner an unprecedented fifty percent or more of the
labor performance will effect the quality of products and diminish a foreign partner's inves-
ment interest in a venture, the Soviets might be persuaded to initiate change in the area of
labor law.
103. HLADIK, supra note 15, at 40.
104. Aronson, supra note 2, at 853.
105. This is an annex of the New York firm Coudert Brothers. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16,
1988, at 32, col. 6.
106. ON THE PARTY'S TASKS IN FUNDAMENTALLY RESTRUCTURING
MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY, Report by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
at the June 25, 1987 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, reprinted in Mos-
cow News (Supp.) No. 27, at 4 (1987)[hereinafter GORBACHEV ADDRESS].
107. KONST. SSSR art. II.
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venture's ownership. 08 Furthermore, and for the first time in history, So-
viet business (including the joint venture) may run itself with very lim-
ited government control. 10 If the Soviet Union was willing to sacrifice
ideology in enacting the joint venture law, it might easily do the same to
ensure their joint ventures retain that viability and attractiveness to the
West. One author has remarked, "[h]aving identified the need to engage
in joint ventures in order to advance .... the Soviet government will not
be restrained by conflicting statutory provisions. Once again, ideology will
be forced to accommodate practical need."" 0 Thus, the Soviets may well
sacrifice more Marxist doctrine in order to incorporate existing Western
law. This ideological flexibility is a virtual precondition to Soviet at-
tempts at reviving their domestic business sector with modern Western
practices."'
VI. CONCLUSION
The benefits that flow from the new Soviet Joint Venture Law have
yet to be fully realized. As joint ventures proliferate and mature, all par-
ties will be able to take full advantage of the law's provisions. Those pro-
visions allow expanded trade between communist and capitalist states.
The Soviets will enjoy access to their Western partners' established busi-
ness connections in the free market; likewise, Western partners will gain
access to a vast Eastern Bloc market alliance."
2
108. Insiders originally acknowledged that the Soviet desire for knowledge, expertise,
and technology possessed exclusively by some firms might give the Soviets a reason to allow
these firms even equal or majority ownership of the venture. Aronson, supra note 2, at 872.
Obviously their hypothesis has been fulfilled in a manner most surprising to even them. See
Interview, supra note 18. It is the power of the Soviet Regime which allows it to do
whatever it wishes with its own Constitution, and as the past has shown us, the Soviet
Constitution is often compromised; for example, freedom of the press and freedom of speech
are guaranteed in the Soviet Constitution. The fact that foreigners, can now own Soviet
based businesses may be the Soviets' most capitalistic compromise.
109. Dunn, supra note 11, at 174. This is the first time that such has been permitted
without government control. Combined with the fact Westerners may receive majority con-
trol over Soviet based property, the right to run the business end of the venture seems
natural, yet incredible when realizing these rights are available to capitalists in the U.S.S.R.
110. Id. at 178.
111. Gorbachev has repeatedly emphasized the need to change existing management
philosophy in the Soviet business strata to engender the efficiency of the West. As
Gorbachev has stated: "The sum of the Nation's substance of the fundamental reshaping of
the Nation's economy control is the switch over . . . from an excessively centralized system
of management to democratic, promoting self-management." CONCLUDING SPEECH OF
M.S. GORBACHEV TO THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, June 25, 1987, reprinted
in Moscow News (Supp.) No. 3276, at 4 (1987). The Soviets have always believed in a pro-
duction enterprise operating under one-man management, with all responsibility for admin-
istration held by a single director. In contrast, capitalism frequently operates with co-equal
decision making, done by a majority of ideas and votes. Aronson, supra note 2, at 874.
112. Section 24 of the Soviet Joint Venture law grants joint ventures the freedom to
trade and transact business in the markets of COMECON member countries. JOINT VEN-
TURE LAW, supra note 3, at sec. 24. The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON) was established on Jan. 30, 1949 and includes the nations of the Soviet Union,
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The joint venture law also presents other historic opportunities. Al-
though there are problems that must be solved, the problems can be
solved. In fact, the chance to resolve difficulties together in an atmo-
sphere of mutual interest may be the greatest benefit of all.
As these East-West trading relationships have evolved from simple
once - off sales and purchases into the complicated transactions ex-
isting today, the partners ... have had to pay more attention to the
mutuality of interest which is inherent in any long-term commercial
relationship.' Is
Resolving these problems will result in formal structures for problem
solving. Structures such as an evolving Soviet commercial law, will lead to
enhanced understanding and cooperation, as well as the establishment of
a new Communist-Capitalist economic culture. More importantly, the
structures will be a way of perpetuating this understanding and coopera-
tion between nations. General Secretary Gorbachev recognized as much
when stating,
Comrades, not one state in the world of today can regard itself iso-
lated from others in the economic respect. Our country is no excep-
tion. International commercial and financial relations of countries and
the latest technological ideas invariably have an impact on our own
economy .... In other words, restructuring of the Soviet economy
will promote broad international cooperation and, hence, better world
relations.'
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, North Korea, Vietnam, and
Cuba. Its goals include the exchange of economic experience, technical aid, material assis-
tance in foodstuffs, raw materials, machines, and technology. Scriven, supra note 5, at 105.
COMECON began as an alliance between communist nations (under Soviet hegemony) to
help war-torn Marxist regimes re-establish growth in their own economic systems and to
encourage the sharing of modern technological information.
113. Id. at 106.
114. GORBACHEV ADDRESS, supra note 106, at 10.
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